25 years ago of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 crash
-Reading the final NTSB report from December 2002, chapter 3
It is with a lump in my chest and a constant reminder to breathe that I read through the minutes leading up to the crash. A transcription from the black box and results of the NTSB report was published on December 30, 2022, almost two years after the accident. Having the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) look into things is a thorough affair, it takes time, it takes effort, it takes people who are good at their job and who are very thorough. Good investigations are worth their time since that is how recommendations and implementations of new procedures will make sure that an accident like this cannot happen again.
I write about the importance of community and showing up for your local community. In this series though, I do a deep dive into a terrible airplane crash that happened 25 years ago with the pilot on board who was from Redlands, California, where I live.
In order to catch up on the accident:
Read the first chapter about the news coverage of the accident here.
Read the second chapter where Captain Ted Thompson's pilot friends talk about who he was to them and their thoughts about the crash here.As a storyteller, what I look for is the situation in the cockpit. What transpired the last thirty minutes of that fateful flight on Monday afternoon, January 31, 2000?
For each direct quote, I’ve put the title of the person speaking. To make the story clearer, I have summarized sections here and there. All timestamps in 24-hour notation (‘military time’) in the local time of the airplane (Pacific time) as it was in the NTSB report.
The time stamp begins at 15:50 (3:50 pm) with the first request for diverting the flight from its planned route to San Francisco to Los Angeles instead. Captain Ted Thompson and First Officer Bill J. Tansky discuss the risk of landing in SF where there might be a wet runway because it’s often rainy there, a LAX landing would be safer.
Minutes previously the pilots contacted the maintenance control facilities in Seattle to discuss a jammed horizontal stabilizer. Two minutes after the diversion request Seattle says there is a major flow problem in LAX and the plane would not be able to land until an hour or 1.5 hours later.
At 15:53 the Captain asks Seattle if they could get help troubleshooting the problem. No response.
“It just blows me away they think we’re gonna land, they’re gonna fix it, now they’re worried about the flow. I’m sorry this airplane’s not gonna go anywhere for a while.. so you know” - Captain.
“So they’re trying to put the pressure on you?” - Flight attendant.
“Well, no, yeah” - Captain.
At 15:56 Ted and Seattle still discuss the differences between landing in SF and LA.
“When I look at it from a safety point I think that something that lowers my groundspeed makes sense” - Captain.
“That’s mean LAX then for you” – Seattle.
At 16:02 the communications switch to Los Angeles.
Five minutes later they are contacted by a mechanic from Alaska Airlines’ LAX maintenance facility. It’s been 14 minutes since the request for troubleshooting was sent. It seems all the things the pilots could have done, they have already been doing. They ask for knowledge about any hidden circuit breakers. After talking for a minute, the mechanic replies he will see them in LA.
16:09 the autopilot is disengaged. There is a sound similar to the horizontal stabilizer-in-motion. The stabilizer moved from 0.4 degrees to 2.5. The airplane nose is pointed down, dropping about 7,500 feet.
“It got worse” - Captain.
16:10 Thompson contacts LAX -“I’ve lost control, vertical pitch.”
“Just help me” - Captain. A bit later he adds – “Yeah, we got it back under control here.”
“No, we don’t” - First Officer. They try different approaches as they have been doing for over twenty minutes at this point.
It’s 16:11.
“We’re kind of stabilized” - Captain, trying yet again to troubleshoot the problem.
“Whatever we did is no good, don’t do that again” - First Officer.
“Yeah, no. It went down, it went full nose down” – Captain, adds, “It’s a lot worse than it was.”
At 16:12 they are back talking to LAX maintenance, explaining how they’ve tried pickle switch and the suitcase handles. Thompson is hesitant troubleshooting the trim system again, the mechanic says “It’s up to you.”
It’s 16:14. They are instructed to talk to a different ARTCC controller at LAX. He asks, “What do you want to do, sir?”
“I need to get down about ten, change my configuration, make sure I can control the jet and I’d like to do that out here over the bay if I may?” – Captain.
Message from the Captain to the passengers:
“Folks, we have had a flight control problem up front here, we’re working it.. uh.. that’s Los Angeles off to the right there, that’s where we’re intending to go. We’re pretty busy up here working this situation, I don’t anticipate any big problems once we get a couple of sub systems on the line, but we will be going into LAX and I’d anticipate us parking there in about twenty to thirty minutes.”
=notice the calmness of the message, while sharing the seriousness of the situation. These pilots are able to keep calm and collected. These pilots have been under stress for 25 minutes at this point. These pilots are meanwhile doing everything in their power to keep everyone safe.
16:16 the flight is cleared to descend to 17,000 feet.
16:17 Thompson tells the flight attendant who opens the door to the cockpit, “I need everything picked up and everybody strapped down cause I’m gonna unload the airplane and see if we can regain control of it that way.” The flight attendant mentions the bang they heard and the pilots tell them that they think the “stab(ilizer) trim thing is broke.” The captain ends the conversation with telling the flight attendant: “I need you everybody strapped in now, dear.”
=I can’t help but notice how Tansky speaks to the flight attendant with such care, such kindness in this difficult situation.
16:18 Thompson and Tansky work on the slat and flaps.
“What I wanna do is get the nose up and then let the nose fall through and see if we can stab(ilize) it when it’s unloaded” – Captain.
It’s 16:19 and in the cockpit we hear a glimpse of optimism.
“I think if it’s controllable, we oughta just try to land it” – First Officer.
“You think so? Okay, let’s head for LA” – Captain.
Four or five thumps can be heard on the recording, followed by an extremely loud noise. Loose articles move in the cockpit. Slats are moved to mid-position, flaps extended, airplane nose down with negative Gs. The airplane is now flying inverted in a last-ditch attempt at keeping it in the air. Left wing is down.
“Mayday” -First Officer (but the message is not transmissioned).
“Push and roll, push and roll” – Captain.
For precious seconds Thompson and Tansky attempt to use the rudder.
16:20 “At least upside down we’re flying” - Captain.
Engine compressor stalls, engine spools down.
16:20:56 last recorded message.
“Ah, here we go” – Captain.
The main wreckage was found at
34 degrees 03.5’ north latitude and 119 degrees 20.8’ west longitude.
In the final NTSB report there is a comment of how the flight personnel seemed the night before the fatal flight:
“The accident flight crew spent the night before the accident at Alaska Airlines’ layover hotel, which was in a resort located outside of Puerto Vallarta. Witness statements and hotel records indicated that the Captain and First Officer watched the Super Bowl in the hotel lounge and ate both breakfast and dinner in the hotel restaurant. […] The flight crew appeared rested before the accident flight.”
And finally, the result of their findings:
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly’s acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airline’s insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly.”
In conclusion, even though the airplane had been cleared through the regular maintenance procedures. Clearly those procedures had been inadequate. There is no way you can operate machinery when the threading is gone.
Reading the last devastating minutes before the crash, I learned how Captain Ted Thompson listened to his First Officer, how both of them worked diligently to solve an unsolvable problem with ingenuity and creativity and the way they were able to keep a professional calmness to the situation and still be kind to the passengers and co-workers/flight attendants. We could all learn a thing or two from them.
If you want to get invested in best practices around safety, I think learning the devastating losses behind accidents will be a great motivator.
Next week, we hear from Marilyn Thompson, the wife of Captain Ted Thompson. Stay tuned, subscribe and share.